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Employee noncompliance of information security policy (ISP) is causing 
organizations more and more money in the battle against cybersecurity threats. Three 
popular theories within employee compliance and ISP research were used to create 
a conceptual framework to help explain the employees’ reflections, namely: 
protection motivation theory, deterrence theory and neutralization theory. A case 
study with faculty members from University of Gothenburg was conducted to see 
how the faculty members reflect when it comes to the ISP at their workplace and 
their own protection behavior. Semi-structured interviews were held digitally with 
six participants. The result indicate that faculty members rarely reflect on their 
protection behavior, they were unaware what the ISP was and even though they 
believed the threat of a cyberattack was medium to high, they still engaged in 
behavior they know could expose the university to unnecessary risk. This research 
can help the university and other government agencies to structure their Security 
Education, Training and Awareness (SETA) to match the employees’ behavior on 
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One of the greatest weaknesses in an organizations’ cybersecurity process are the employees 
(Boss et al., 2009; Luo et al., 2011; Cole, 2015). No matter how extensive an organization’s 
cybersecurity system is, a simple mistake from an ignorant employee can make it all for 
nothing. Richardson (2008) showed that insider neglect is second highest cause of successful 
cyberattacks after virus incidents. Cisco (2021) reported that 53 % of cyberattacks result in 
$500,000 or more in damages. Additionally, Gartner (2021) report that roughly $134 billion 
was spent on security and risk management worldwide, making it a relevant issue for all 
organizations.  
Due to the increased digitalization of society, risk management of information system security 
(ISS) is critical for organizational survival (Herath & Rao, 2009). Already in 2004 did Vroom 
and von Solms bring attention to the issue of how insider negligence caused security breaches 
and noted that the organizations which pay attention to non-technical factors in their 
cybersecurity processes are more successful in their efforts. Despite much research being 
published on the area, organizations have struggled to implement effective information security 
policies (ISP) (Johnston, Warkentin & Siponen, 2015).  
The most common forms of cyberattacks are malware such as viruses, spyware, ransomware 
and worms; phishing; man-in-the-middle attacks, which steals and filters data, often gained 
access through unsecure WIFI connections or malware; DDoS attack to exhaust and use up all 
resources and bandwidth; SQL injection used to get information from webpages by entering 
malicious code on a webpage’s regular input box such as a search field or the fields for login 
credentials; zero-day exploit which takes advantage of a network vulnerability before it is fixed; 
DNS tunneling which can be used to bypass IT monitoring or allow remote management of a 
compromised device. (Cisco, 2021)  
Higher education and other government agencies are seen being targeted more frequently by 
cybercriminals, mostly deploying ransomware attacks (FBI Flash, 2021). The cybercriminals 
steal sensitive employee data which can be used to extort the individual employee. Furthermore, 
several big IT scandals involving Swedish government agencies have been reported over the 
last couple of years (see: TT, 2019; Holmberg Karlsson, 2017). A case study will be conducted 
at University of Gothenburg, which had an IT debacle where faculty members were unable to 
access or receive email and could not access their calendar, losing important emails and missing 
meetings (Göteborgs Universitet, 2020). Showing there is a lack of strategic and mindfully 
implemented cybersecurity at these institutions. Therefore, understanding how faculty members 
reflect on their protective behavior, along with the ISP of the university where they work, 




Lowry, Dinev and Willison (2017) call for research to be done on employees’ decision-making 
process in order to find better solutions for organizations battling with the problem of employee 
compliance. Therefore, the aim of this study is to help contribute to literature on decision-
making and ISS, by exploring faculty members’ reflections on the ISP and all official IT 
security rules at their workplace. ISP and official IT security rules will for the remainder of this 
thesis only be referred to as ISP. The research question this study aims to answer is: 
How do faculty members reflect on university information security policy? 
To bring more insight of how to approach the issue of employee compliance at universities, 
three of the most common ISS theories will be used to interpret the data, protection motivation 
theory (PMT), deterrence theory (DT) and neutralization theory (NT). A conceptual framework 
based on these theories was formed to connect the theories and give a new perspective on 
employee compliance. The conceptual framework is used to structure the discussion of the 
findings for a more nuanced argument.  
The study is limited to a single university setting, with semi-structured interviews being 
conducted with full-time employees. By doing interviews in single case study the 
generalizability of the findings is limited. Instead, this study aims to give qualitative data which 
will provide valuable insight into the thoughts of the employees at a Swedish university. 
Furthermore, the scope is limited to the reflections of the employees and will not investigate 
how PMT, DT and NT relate to the actual intention to engage in protective behaviors (for 
research on this see: Ifinedo, 2012; Herath and Rao, 2009; Aurigemma & Mattson, 2017). 
Practical implications of the research are a better structure of Security Education, Training and 
Awareness (SETA) which will engage the employees where they are in their reflections on the 
cybersecurity, hopefully resulting in higher compliance with ISP and thus, better protection of 
confidential data. 
The structure of the thesis is as follows: in the next section, previous research in the field of ISS 
is discussed together with the relevant literature within PMT, DT and NT. In the third section 
the method used to investigate the research question is described. Thereafter, the results from 
the case study are presented, then a discussion is held to provide more insights to the 
implications of the results. Lastly, is a conclusion summarizing the findings and answering the 






2 PREVIOUS RESEARCH 
Dhillon and Backhouse (2000) wrote a paper about the dangers of digitalizing your business 
without fully understanding the new security threats of cyberspace and planning for these 
accordingly. The field of information security is still being explored and is ever evolving 
together with the advancements of technology.  
Cram, D’arcy and Proudfoot (2019) made an extensive meta-study in order to optimize the 
theoretical framing when researching security policy compliance. They found that personal 
norms, attitude and ethics were the most significant when predicting employee compliance. 
Further, they found that punishment expectancy, severity and rewards were the least significant. 
Self-efficacy and response efficacy had average to high effect on compliance. Cram et al. (2019) 
also found that the variables could have different effects on intended compliance compared to 
actual compliance. The findings call out for more research on what employees’ attitude and 
norms relating to ISP are and why the effectiveness of variables can differ depending on the 
circumstances (Cram et al., 2019).  
2.1 Protection Motivation Theory 
Roger (1975) developed the protection motivation theory (PMT) to understand fear appeal. He 
wanted to see how fear influence behavior and the changed frequency of behavior in response 
to fear. Protection motivation is the intention to perform a desired behavior (Norman, Boer & 
Seydel, 2005). The theory works from the assumption that external or internal stimuli can 
trigger two appraisal processes: coping appraisal and threat appraisal.  
Norman et al. (2005) outlines the main components of PMT: 
Adaptive response A part of coping appraisal. It is the process which push for 
the desired behavior to be performed. The higher the coping 
appraisal is, the more likely it is that the employee engage 
an adaptive response. 
Maladaptive responses The behavior which are aimed to reduce the fear of a threat 
but does not reduce the threat itself.  
Severity The perceived level of impact of the threat. 
Vulnerability The employee’s perception of: “…the probability that an 
unwanted incident happens if no actions are taken to prevent 
it” (Vance et al., 2012, p. 191). 
Rewards Benefits of engaging in maladaptive responses which will 




Response efficacy “The belief that the adaptive [coping] response will work, 
that taking the protective action will be effective in 
protecting the self or others” (Floyd, Prentice-Dunn & 
Rogers, 2000, p. 411). 
Self-efficacy The employee’s belief that they can perform the desired 
protective behavior. 
Response cost Barriers which hinder the employee’s ability to perform the 
protective behavior/adaptive response. 
 
Posey, Roberts and Lowry (2015) emphasize the importance of human behavior and ISP in the 
effort to ensure the success of a cybersecurity project. Furthermore, their study is one of few 
which considers both protective intentions and protective behavior. Protective intention is the 
employee’s intention to engage in protective behavior and protective behavior is behaviors 
performed by the employee in order to protect data or the organization. Posey et al. (2015) have 
a nuanced discussion about PMT and its literature, pointing out that the use of PMT and the 
results from the studies have been inconsistent. Nevertheless, they deem it to be an appropriate 
theory to help explain employee compliance and make two important points. First one, is that 
employees have a considerable control over the information they have at work and it is their 
choice to actively protect this information or not. This is an important point because it is an 
underlying assumption when investigating employee compliance and it highlights the fact that 
even if there were no policy telling the employee what to do, they still have a choice if they 
want to protect the information or not. The second point they make, is that some protective 
behaviors require more energy than other behaviors. This is also an underlying assumption 
which can help explain why some protective behaviors may be more common among 
employees than others.  
Anderson and Agarwal (2010) state that PMT is one of the most efficient theories in predicting 
if an individual will engage in protection behavior. Ifinedo (2012) saw that combining PMT 
with another theory, in this case theory of planned behavior (TPB), better explained ISP 
compliance and found several correlations between the factors of PMT and ISP compliance. 
Interestingly, the factor response cost did not show a negative correlation to ISP compliance, 
which was hypothesized. Also worth noting, is that perceived severity did not have a positive 
influence on ISP compliance. It is common to combine PMT with one of more theories in order 
to better capture the essence of the results.  
Another example of someone who added to PMT to gain more value from the theory is Vance, 
Siponen and Pahnila (2012). They did a study combining PMT with a habit factor. They 
investigate if past and automatic behavior influence employees’ decision to comply. Vance et 
al. (2012) applied all the appraisal factors of PMT with the addition of the habit factor. The 
reason they add habit to the theory is because of the “pervasive effect of habit on human 
behavior” (Vance et al., 2012, p. 190). They add the habit factor before any PMT factor, thus 




(2012), Vance et al. (2012) found that vulnerability instead of severity had an insignificant 
effect on employee compliance. They further found that habit had a strong correlation with all 
PMT variables. 
Warkentin, Johnston, Shropshire and Barnett (2016) use the term ‘perceived extraneous 
circumstances’ to capture both rewards and response cost in one term. The study aimed to see 
how PMT affected protective security behavior continuation, which means performing a 
protective behavior more than once. However, Warkentin et al. (2016) see the extraneous 
circumstances as something which affect the behavior directly rather than through the threat 
and coping appraisals like in the original theory put forward by Rogers (1975). Warkentin et al. 
(2016) also did not find that response efficacy had a correlation with intention continuation. 
Similarly did Vance et al. (2012) find that response efficacy had the opposite effect on intention. 
Therefore, does neither study support that response efficacy have positive influence on 
protective behavioral intentions. This shows that there are some contingencies in PMT making 
further research exploring new perspectives highly relevant. 
A lack of a salient threat may lead these individuals to believe that they are no 
longer susceptible and discontinue the associated behavior. Other research 
suggests that organizational members must believe in the efficacy of a new 
security measure before they will use it. (Warkentin et al., 2016, p. 25) 
Moody, Siponen and Pahnila (2018) have combined several of the common theories in 
employee compliance research and formed one more unified ISS model. It draws the main 
factors from theory of interpersonal behavior, which is quite similar to a combined PMT and 
deterrence theory (DT). The model becomes a good summary of the various theories and 
models which are used to try to explain employee (non)compliance. The model also includes a 
habit factor and put emphasis on fear appeal’s relationship with employee compliance. Moody 
et al. (2018) show that the many of the ISS theories, working from different assumption and 
backgrounds, can be combined to form an overarching model illustrating the correlation 
between several factors explaining employee compliance.  
2.2 Deterrence Theory 
Deterrence theory (DT) work from the assumption that given the choice people will avoid 
certain action if the sanctions are severe, certain and swift enough (Gibbs, 1968). The theory is 
based on Beccaria’s work from 1764 and is one of the most cited theory in ISS research between 
1990-2004 (Siponen, Willison & Baskerville, 2008). Informal sanctions were added by 
Williams and Hawkins in 1986, such as shame and guilt. Paternoster and Simpson (1996) 
further developed shame as a component but see this as separate from formal and informal 
sanctions because it is self-imposed. Current DT discourse suggests that individuals evaluate 
the perceived costs of both formal and informal sanctions before deciding whether or not to 




The main components of deterrence theory are the formal sanctions: certainty, severity and 
swiftness (Beccaria [1764]1963). In order for a formal sanction to be effective it should have 
high certainty of happening, so likelihood of getting caught and the organization acting on the 
transgression. It should be severe, if the punishment is too lenient it will not deter from the 
unwanted behavior and the benefit of the transgression will be perceived as higher than the 
consequence of the violation. Lastly, the formal sanction should be swift, if it takes too long 
between the transgression and the punishment then it is likely for the violation to be partly 
forgotten. In addition to the formal sanctions, does Piquero and Tibbetts (1996) present informal 
sanctions such as self-approval and social approval. Self-approval refers to how a person views 
themselves and their actions. Social approval is how people in the person’s environment view 
the person’s actions. Both which can influence whether or not a person violates the social norms 
and rules.  
D’arcy and Herath (2011) saw in their literature review of deterrence theory that the effect of 
sanctions varied depending on the individual. Therefore, the fundamental assumptions that 
people will avoid certain action if the sanctions are certain, swift and severe enough, is more 
complex than first assumed. D’arcy and Herath (2011) present several individual and contextual 
factors which are seen affecting the degree to which the person is deterred by sanction threats. 
The individual factors are: self-control (individuals with low self-control are more likely to 
ignore threats of sanctions (Pogarsky & Piquero, 2004)), computer self-efficacy (CSE) (how 
confident the individual is in their general computer ability and their ability in specific programs 
and IS tasks (Marakas, Johnson & Clay, 2007)) and moral beliefs (to what extent does the 
person believe an illicit act to be morally wrong (Paternoster & Simpson, 1996)). The contextual 
factors are: virtual status (how much of the employee’s work is done away from the central 
workplace (Wiesenfeld, Raghuram & Garud, 1999)) and employee position (is the employee 
full-time, part-time, manager etc. (Tittle, 1980). Furthermore, D’arcy (2005) showed that as 
computer literacy increases, IS misuse will increase as well due to employees becoming more 
confident that they can work around the security systems and avoid security threats. Several of 
these variables overlap with PMT or other DT variables, most obvious being computer self-
efficacy versus PMT’s self-efficacy or moral beliefs which are similar to self-approval. Piquero, 
Paternoster, Pogarsky and Loughran (2011) support D’arcy and Herath’s (2011) argument that 
individual factors carry significance when determining the effectiveness of deterrents.  
The research on deterrence theory have evolved not only to include the informal sanctions, but 
also to focus on individuals’ responses to sanctions and threats (c.f. D’arcy & Herath, 2011; 
Piquero et al, 2011). Therefore, researching not only how the individual differences influence 
the likelihood of ISP (non)compliance, but also what the individuals themselves think about the 




2.3 Neutralization Theory 
Siponen and Vance (2010) talks about how neutralization techniques affect employees’ 
intention to violate the ISP. They compared neutralization techniques to deterrence theory and 
found that neutralization was a strong predictor of intention to violate ISP. Sykes and Matza 
(1957) presents neutralization theory and claim that both rule-breakers and rule-followers 
generally believe in the established norms and values of society, indicating that it is not a 
disbelief in the norms and values which causes people to break the rules. Neutralization theory 
(NT) presents techniques which people can use to justify their actions (Siponen & Vance, 2010). 
These techniques allow people to keep their norms and values aligned with society, but still 
engage in rule breaking (Piquero et al., 2005).  
Siponen and Vance (2010) presents a modified version of NT adapted to ISS research. They 
divided neutralization into six determinants, presented here in order of the highest significance 
they found: ‘metaphor of the ledger’, ‘defense of necessity’, ‘denial of injury’, ‘appeal to higher 
loyalties’, ‘condemn the condemners’, and ‘denial of responsibility’ (Siponen & Vance, 2010).  
Rogers and Buffalo (1974) explain that denial of responsibility is when a person claim the 
action is beyond their control. Siponen and Vance (2010) use the example of poachers breaking 
the law because one did not know hunting was prohibited or programmers blaming the 
computer when they have made a mistake. Denial of injury is when a person justifies their 
action by undermining the damage it can cause (Sykes & Matza, 1957). For instance, when 
hackers explain that their crimes are victimless because they are attacking a computer (Siponen 
& Vance, 2010). Defense of necessity is the technique of claiming that the violation was 
necessary therefore one should not feel guilty (Minor 1981). This could be used when an 
employee breaks the security policy because they felt they had to in order to finish their work. 
Byers et al. (1999) describe condemnation the condemners as neutralizing one’s actions by 
putting the blame on the target. For example, violating the ISP because they think it is 
unreasonable or unjust. The technique, appeal to higher loyalties, means using a higher 
authority to explain one’s actions (Piquero, Tibbetts & Blankenship, 2005). For instance, an 
employee violates the ISP and explain their behavior by appealing to the company values or a 
memo from management. The metaphor of the ledger, which was the most significant technique 
in Siponen and Vance’s study (2010), means that by doing good you compensate for any 
wrongdoing. In terms of employees, each time they comply with the ISP, they can then violate 
it, because they are in the black.  
Gwebu, Wang and Hu (2016) found that neutralization was a more effective explanation for 
noncompliance than other variables, such as social culture. They also found that neutralization 
increase the effect of perceived response cost by encouraging noncompliance. Thus, concluding 
that neutralization may be a stronger predictor when it comes to employee compliance than 
other variables from PMT and DT. Therefore, making NT an interesting addition to the other 
theories on order to gain a better understanding of employees’ reflections on protection 




2.4 Combining the Theories 
DT and NT are often researched together, examples being: Silic, Barlow and Back (2017), 
Willison and Warkentin (2013) and Cheng, Li, Zhai and Smyth (2014). Vance and Siponen 
(2010) combine DT and NT by studying how both influences the intention to violate the ISP. 
Furthermore, DT and PMT is also researched together in several instances, examples being: 
Moody et al. (2018), Kinnunen (2016) and Johnston et al. (2015). Herath and Rao (2009) 
combine DT and PMT similarly to how DT and NT was combined, by seeing how the variables 
from both theories affect ISP compliance intention. Thus, showing that the theories work from 
assumptions which are possible to combine to get a wider perspective on employee 
(non)compliance.  
However, PMT and NT are rarely researched together, this thesis will help filling the gap to see 
how well these theories work together when combined. PMT’s maladaptive response is not to 
be confused with maladaptive behavior. Where maladaptive response aims to reduce the fear 
(Posey et al., 2015) and maladaptive behavior is e.g., violating the ISP. Maladaptive response 
could be seen overlapping with the neutralization techniques presented by Siponen and Vance 
(2010). High threat appraisal increases the likelihood of maladaptive responses such as wishful 
thinking and avoidance, which is similar to neutralization techniques such as denial of 
responsibility. However, the difference being that maladaptive responses aim to reduce fear 
while neutralization techniques aim to justify maladaptive behavior. Moody et al. (2018) makes 
an attempt at combining these theories and does so by introducing the factor: reactance. 
Reactance means denying that there is an ISS problem altogether. This is in addition to current 
choices of compliance and noncompliance, giving the individual three possible ways to react, 
comply, violate, or ignore. Reactance, is in their theory, influenced by both the fear appeal from 
PMT and neutralization techniques from NT. So, like with the other studies combining two or 
more theories, they investigate how the theories influence a third variable when combined.  
Combining all three theories will give a wider understanding of how the faculty members reflect 
on ISP. The study is not looking to find a correlation between faculty reflections and intention 
to comply to ISP, but provide in-depth knowledge about individual reflection by analyzing the 
data with the help of PMT, DT and NT. Therefore, providing a foundation to build further 







3 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
A conceptual framework was formed based on the previous research presented above. The 
framework combines the three theories: protection motivation theory (PMT), deterrence theory 
(DT) and neutralization theory (NT), into a simple model. The framework presents the different 
variables which will be used from each theory in the remainder of the thesis.  
Both PMT and DT build on an individual’s level of fear of a threat (Rogers, 1975; Gibbs, 1968). 
PMT fear appeal is based on threats external to the organization, while DT builds on threats 
from internal factors, such as the organization where they work, their colleagues and their moral 
compass. Therefore, the theories complement each other and give a more holistic view, 
covering more situations and factors an employee may reflect on. NT on the other hand, discuss 
more the coping mechanisms when not complying with the rules. PMT have two coping factors 
which increase likelihood of compliance, response efficacy and self-efficacy (Rogers, 1975). 
However, these work to affect the behavior in direct response to the threat. NT does therefore 
bring a new way to understand how the employees think by explaining noncompliance. In 
previous studies all three theories have been used to bring light as to why employees comply or 
do not comply with ISP. When they are combined they cover employees’ reasoning of the 
external threat of a cyberattack (PMT), the believed effectiveness and capability of their 
protective behavior (PMT), the consequences they face if they violate the rules, both formal 
and informal (DT), and lastly, how they justify their noncompliance behavior (NT). Each theory 
help bring understanding to a different aspect of security compliance and by using all theories 
together, this thesis aim shed light on faculty members’ reflections on the security situation, 
their behavior, the consequences and their internal dialogue.  
To bring further understanding on how these theories are connected and complement each other, 
a conceptual framework has been formed, see figure 1. The codes presented under each theory 
are later used when analyzing the data from the interviews to form relevant themes which will 
help answer: How do faculty members reflect on university information security policy? In the 
spirit of previous studies combining these theories, they are joined to see how they together 
help broaden the understanding of the faculty members’ reflections. The study assumes that 
combining all three when analyzing and discussing the research data will result in the most in-








This study is not looking at actual compliance with ISP, but rather how the faculty members 
reflect on ISP and will use the three theories to shape the perspective and understanding of those 
reflections to be able to contribute to the literature on employee compliance and ISP. Therefore, 
as you can see in figure 1, most theories study to see how the theories affect Intention to 
Comply, this study aim to understand how the faculty members’ reflections can be understood 
with the help of the theories.  







4.1 Research Approach 
The aim of the thesis is to evaluate how faculty members reflect on the organization’s 
information security policies (ISP) along with their protection behavior. Therefore, the 
empirical data was collected in a single case study through semi-structured interviews because 
it is appropriate when aiming to provide an “in-depth understanding of a single or small number 
of cases; set in their real-world contexts” (Yin, 2011, p. 4). Additionally, inductive reasoning 
was used to explore the research question: How do faculty members reflect on university 
information security policy? Inductive reasoning is used to be able to generate meaning from 
the empirical data collected through the interviews to be able to identify patterns and answer 
the research question (Bell & Bryman, 2018). Furthermore, by using an exploratory research 
design the study will better capture the How of the research question and provide insight into 
the phenomenon of employee compliance with the focus of faculty members’ reflections 
(Denscombe, 2014).  
4.2 Research Setting 
The case study was conducted at the department of Applied IT at the University of Gothenburg. 
The department conduct research in informatics; cognition and communication; learning, 
communication and IT; and human-computer interaction (University of Gothenburg, 2021). 
There is a significant amount of international and English-speaking professors and lecturers. 
It’s a medium-sized department with five divisions and a total of 90 staff members. There were 
no information security researchers working for the department at the time the study took place.  
The university was chosen for this study because the professors have access to sensitive student 
data, such as personal information, potential candidates, existing students and previous student, 
through large government databases and handle confidential research data. Because of this, it 
could make them a potential victim of e.g., ransomware attacks or DDoS attacks. Furthermore, 
the University of Gothenburg had a great IT incident in September 2020 where faculty members 
lost access to their email and calendar for several weeks. Emails from several years back were 
lost and never recovered. Therefore, it is highly relevant to research how the faculty members 
at a department at University of Gothenburg think regarding their information security.  
4.3 Data Collection 
Tittle (1980) pointed out that employee position can be a contextual factor affecting employee 




lecturers to participate. Since there were no active information security research taking place, 
everyone with the titles professor or senior lecturer were asked to participate. The interviews 
were conducted in either Swedish or English depending on the participants’ preference. All 
professors and senior lecturers who were available and wanted to participate were interviewed.  
The department of Applied IT was chosen because all professors and lecturers are assumed to 
have basic IT knowledge as well as an extended understanding of cyberspace, however 
theoretical. Furthermore, they educate students in digitalization and publish information system 
research which makes their knowledge, interest and general attitude towards information 
security influential beyond their actions.  
4.3.1 Interviews 
Conducting interviews is an effective method to get primary data to give a deeper understanding 
of a topic (Bell & Bryman, 2018). The aim of the study is to bring more understanding of faculty 
members’ internal reflections. Therefore, semi-structured interviews were chosen to allow the 
participants to talk more freely about their reflections and allow follow-up questions for 
interesting and relevant thoughts. Semi-structured interviews also give some basic structure 
ensuring that the topics important to this study is covered in each interview (see: Appendix). 
This will help to get an accurate picture of how the participants think about the information 
security policy (ISP).  
The interviews were held digitally on the platform Zoom. Cameras were on during the whole 
interview to establish a rapport. The participants answered both general questions about ISP 
and questions related to each theory/model. They were also asked what they think about their 
employer’s ISP and information security in general.  
Table 1. Participant, position and month they were interviewed. 
Participant Position Month 2021 
P1 Senior Lecturer March 
P2 Senior Lecturer March  
P3 Senior Lecturer April 
P4 Senior Lecturer April  
P5 Professor April  










The documents were collected from the university’s website (see: Medarbetarportalen, 2021). 
The documents collected were:  
Table 2. Documents for Secondary Data. 
Document Name Retrieved Description 
Policy for IT security 15 March 2021 Overarching IT security 
policy 
Regulations for IT security 15 March 2021 The IT security rules for 
everyone at the university 
Policy for security work 15 March 2021 More general policy on 
university’s security  
Din Säkerhet 15 May 2021 Short employee guide for 
online and fire safety 
 
They were used in the interviews to provide necessary information to the participants and make 
sure I know what the university’s official ISP is. Additionally, the documents provided 
information about what the faculty members are expected to know and comply with.  
The information security policy (ISP) in this thesis includes all rules and guidelines in the 
documents above. Such as, changing password every 6 months and not use Box for data which 
is confidential or containing personal details (Din Säkerhet, p. 2). Also, when employees use a 
cloud service they “must, before usage, consider the risks in relation to the information/material 
… based on GU’s regulations for information classification.” (Regulations for IT security, p.5).  
4.3.3 Ethical considerations 
Participants were asked questions about their knowledge about their employer’s information 
security policy and what they think about their employer’s ISP. This could have internal 
consequences for the individual participant. Therefore, all participants are anonymous. 
Participants were kept anonymous by limiting the information about each individual. They are 
only referred to as participant 1, participant 2, etc. Furthermore, since the division they worked 
in had no significant effect on the findings, all information which could be linked to a specific 
division is also removed to further secure the anonymity of the individual. 
4.4 Data Analysis 
The interviews were transcribed continually shortly after they were conducted. The text was 
mindfully read to find quotes which highlighted the relevant subjects from each interview 
(Denscombe, 2014). Thematic analysis was used to sort the emergent themes. A thematic 
analysis helped find the general themes from the data and see how these themes were 




on the variables from the theories used in the conceptual framework from section three. These 
codes were then organized into relevant themes presented in the result section. An example of 
the coding is showed in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Thematic analysis of interview data. 
Quotes Codes Themes 
I'm not sure about the policy 
actually. (P4) 
 
Denial of Responsibility (NT) 
Lack of Knowledge 
We know very little about the 
policy and maybe it’s not 
really our fault, in my opinion. 
(P5) 
 
Condemn the Condemners 
(NT) 
I wouldn't be fooled into, sort 
of stereotypical phishing 








I would kind of say that 
probably in terms of like a 
vulnerability, which is sort of 
an intensity of being targeted, 
it's probably somewhere 




Consequences of a 
Cyberattack 
No, judging by this disaster 
with the emails it takes the 
University an incredibly long 
time to respond to any [IT 
disturbance]. They don't have 
the capacity. (P1) 
Severity (PMT) 
4.5 Covid-19 
The study was conducted in Gothenburg, Sweden during the spring of 2021 in the middle of 




recommended that all teaching and research to be done digitally. Due to this, the interviews 
were not considered to be done in any other way other than digitally. However, other criteria 
such as camera on during the interview were in place, see more above under, interviews. A few 






The results from the interviews are presented below under the themes found from the analysis. 
The interviews showed that there is a clear commitment and understanding that cybersecurity 
is important both professionally and personally.  
The importance of keeping information that is personal, safe and so forth, is extremely 
important in the day and age that we live in where so much of what we do is digital in 
one form or another. (P3) 
An interesting finding is that most of the participants’ reflections on ISP were similar with the 
lack of knowledge of the ISP being the most prevalent issue.  
Figure 2. The most common words used in the interviews. 
 
5.1 Consequences of Cyberattacks 
All participants agreed that there is always a risk of the university being the victim of a 
cyberattack. However, some deemed it to be a lower or average risk, wondering why anyone 
would target a university, while others saw a higher risk and an increased interest in government 
agencies such as universities. Some shared similar opinions on the university’s vulnerability 
and believed the risk to be medium to high, participant 4 pointed out that there is a growing 
understanding that government organizations, including universities, can be targeted and 
vulnerable to cyberattacks. The others saw the risk as average or low. The ones who believed 
in a lower risk tended to be more skeptical towards ISP in general and had more demands on it 
being invisible. The ones who believed in a higher vulnerability were more open to adding more 




reflections other than more willingness to learn about the ISP. There was also the idea that there 
is not much to protect. With participant 1 wondering why anyone would target a university 
employee, seeing the risk as low. In the same spirit did participant 5 point out that often they 
were not handling anything sensitive.  
When it comes to the consequences and severity of an attack, the belief in the university’s 
capability to respond was low. Participant 6 pointed out that there is a general idea that the 
university would be slow to act and be very by the book, doing things in the right order and 
therefore having a less effective response. Overall, the participants were hesitant to respond and 
often they refer to in the IT incident which happened in September 2020. In some cases, this 
incident effected the participants’ belief in the IT system at large. They argued that this incident 
showed the lack capacity from the university, where participant 5 wonders how the employees 
can be expected to know things when the university themselves does not, “you have to know 
what you’re doing and the university doesn’t always know themselves”. The employees 
suffered professional damage and it was also something which caused a lot of frustration and 
was met with a level of disbelief on how badly handled the whole situation was.  
No, judging by this disaster with the emails it takes the University an incredibly long 
time to respond to any [IT disturbance]. They don't have the capacity; they don't have 
the strategic kind of thinking to deal with many of these issues. (P1) 
Additionally, they often mentioned their lack of technical knowledge on the area before 
answering, pointing out that they are not aware of the status of the university’s IT infrastructure. 
5.2 Defense & Role of the Employee 
5.2.1 Effectiveness  
Many express that they do not know, but they hope that the security systems and routines will 
work. They have more of a hands-off approach, most likely because of a general lack of 
knowledge of the ISP they choose to believe that the systems will be effective, even though 
there is an underlying lack of faith. Many no longer report spam email to the IT department 
because they get so many. Nevertheless, most participants praised the IT department for being 
competent and helpful.  
Participant 1 and 3 points out that people have their passwords saved so some security systems 
which logs the person out, forcing them to log in again for added security, becomes useless 
since they just click log in again since the password is already filled in. Moreover, the main 
system they use logs them after about 10min of inactivation, participant 1 saying, “like if your 
computer goes to sleep or whatever, then it logs you out again and then you have to type in 
everything all over again, which is super annoying”. This shows the lack of thought put into 
the security system and leaves the employees wondering why the system is there. It disturbs 
their workflow and thus having systems which eats up their time and energy becomes a great 




overall security process, an example is being forced to have multiple login which results in 
people having their login credentials on a post-it next to their computer. 
Furthermore, employees show that maybe not all of the policy is appreciated or something 
they agree with. Participant 6 stating, “I mean, I think you have to know the policy, because 
maybe there are around three things which are important”, and participant 1 even more 
boldly saying, “a lot of those are ridiculous. I wouldn't follow them anyway”, showing that 
the lack of effort by the university directly affect the faculty members’ willingness to follow 
all of the ISP. This is also interesting because they are unfamiliar with the ISP but already 
have some doubt whether it is effective or not. In both quotes above there is however the 
space for a few good ISP, which they can agree with and hopefully then follow. Nevertheless, 
participant 6 says there might be three important ones and participant 1 says a lot are 
ridiculous, showing that the majority of ISP are seen as less useful and ineffective.  
5.2.2 Employee Capability 
The participants thought themselves to be fairly educated on the most common cyberthreats. 
Participant 4 stating, “if I just say for myself, whether I have some competence, I would say 
yes”. However, the only cyberattack mentioned and which they elaborate on is phishing emails. 
In regard to these phishing emails did several participants express an expectation that they 
would, and should, not fall victim to them, because that it would be embarrassing.  
I wouldn't be fooled into, sort of stereotypical phishing emails and stuff like this, but if 
it were to happen, of course it would be you sort of feel a bit foolish or disappointed to 
fall for of something like that. So, I think it would be the level of embarrassment. I 
suppose we all are supposed to be relatively tech savvy. (P3) 
Several participants freely listed the different protective behaviors they engage in. Often they 
also listed other protective behaviors which they do not engage in but is often talked about. 
Additionally, they also talk about some of the common cyberthreats and cybersecurity 
recommendations such as, avoiding suspicious websites, password recommendations, 
protecting your transaction data, be careful with what you download, the problems of having 
many different and international suppliers and not mixing your professional and personal 
devices and logins. However, it is also pointed out that they often do not comply with these, as 
many put it, common sense rules. 
It was also brought up that the workload will affect the employees’ possibility to learn new 
routines and programs, as participant 6 said, “when you are overburden you don’t have the 
energy learn new things”. Since they already have a heavy workload, having to learn new 
security programs and routines will take away from their actual work. Therefore, the 
educational support they get, along with a helpful IT department, was much appreciated. But 
the barriers to contact IT support can sometimes be too high and the fact that they sit in a 
different location limits the possibility for IT to actually show the employee how to do 




employees trying to figure out the systems themselves, which may be less than ideal. Participant 
2 capturing the problem, “I assume all of those have been audited and are approved equally for 
storage. But, also, I don't know for sure.” Showing that the participants make assumptions of 
the systems and try to figure it out but they do not know what the best course of action is. The 
solutions the employees find may not be the correct and secure way. Furthermore, participant 
6 brought up that technical problems during lecture will reduce time spent teaching students. 
Whenever they spend a lot of time trying to fix any IT problem it takes away time and energy 
from their primary tasks. Participant 6 confessing that, “I can’t say I’m technically 
knowledgeable”, highlighting why employees having to figure things out IT problems for 
themselves is an issue, simply because the IT department is too far away, even though they are 
very helpful when contacted. 
5.2.3 Moral of the Self and Others 
The participants have clear differences in how they judge their actions. Most agreed that 
keeping their personal information safe was important and something they engaged actively in. 
When it comes to the workplace they believe they should follow the university’s restrictions 
because they are in place for a reason. Some participants were more relaxed and not very 
bothered about the ISP, while others were more concerned and interested in finding out what 
the policy is and what they do not know. Most agreed that keeping track of updates and such is 
their own responsibility as long as the IT department support and remind them. Participant 6 
believed that management should play a role and take responsibility to mention it and highlight 
the importance of these updates and security measures. Participant 3 on the other hand, pointed 
out that each individual need to take responsibility because they all have different needs and 
expectations on these systems.  
Participant 4 did not focus much on the ISP or security in general instead they said, “I think for 
me I focus more on my research and on my teaching” showing that security is not a priority 
because that is not what they are hired to do. However, the participant further state, “as an 
employee of the University, I think okay, if they have certain rules then as an employee I should 
probably follow it” so even though they may not actively engage in the security work, they are 
willing to follow the ISP, as long as it is reasonable and does not stand in the way of their 
research and teaching.  
Furthermore, cybersecurity is rarely, if ever, talked about at the workplace. It is not something 
mentioned by the management nor brought up by the employees. It could be mentioned if 
someone get a weird email or something have happened to someone. Nothing preventative. 
Nevertheless, there is a social culture surrounding shadow IT. Other programs and software 
which has not been approved by the university is used and since these sites are quite common 
and convenient, people who reflect on the safety of these sites does not speak up because they 
do not want to be annoying or cause problems in the group, especially if they are not the one 




It is the social aspect. You have to share certain things and then we do it in boxes, e.g. 
in, what’s it called? Google docs. They say, now we’re going to share! And I think, is 
that good? Because it is a private company you share with and it’s interview data. (P5) 
Participant 4 and 6 both say that they do not discuss cybersecurity at the workplace or in their 
work group. Participant 3, when reflecting on the social aspect, do not think that there is 
pressure from the group to behave securely but rather obvious to everyone that digital 
information needs to be handled seriously, further stating, “it's important to all of us because 
we take it quite seriously and professionally”. There is a consensus that a dialogue about 
cybersecurity is lacking. The participants do not feel like it is their fault, but they also expressed 
little need for it and it was not something they were actively missing.  
5.2.4 Lack of Knowledge of ISP 
The lack of knowledge of the ISP was brought up several times during each interview. This is 
what the participants considered the biggest problem. Some pointed out they go with the easiest 
option, doing what they usually do or the same way they deal with a problem in private. It is 
also clear they feel that it is the university’s responsibility to educate them if it is important, 
that this is not something which should be the employees’ responsibility. As participant 5 put 
it, “we know very little about the policy and maybe it’s not really our fault, in my opinion”.  
On the other hand, along with various GDPR pop-ups and license agreements, did participant 
1 point out that at some point there was probably a screen with a lot of text, they just clicked 
accept and does not have any clue what was written there and what they have agreed to. 
Furthermore, the document Din Säkerhet, presents a short summary of the most important 
security policies the faculty members need to consider, which no one had read. Showing little 
engagement from the employees’ side even though there are efforts being made from the 
university.  
Participant 4, among others, clearly stated, “I'm not sure about the policy actually”, not a single 
participant could mention one thing in the ISP, but some could guess or assumed certain rules 
were written. They do not know the ISP and expressed that they do not mean to break it if they 
do. But even so, they expect themselves to have the common sense to engage in a certain level 
of protective behavior. Also, even though they claim not to intentionally violate the ISP, they 
admit to engaging in unsafe behavior online. 
Participant 5 called out for more information about the routines, the security systems and what 
they need to do for it to function. The reason being that they are unaware of what system exist 
and what to do in different situations. All participants agreed that there is a lack of knowledge 
and participant 2 developed on this explaining that even though they sometimes do the easiest 
thing, such as google drive or similar, they do not know if that is the best thing to do. There is 
little choice because they are unsure what the correct system and correct routines are. As 
participant 2 puts it, “it's not written down in the big red letters with what you need to do”, 




they can access their account is not the right way if they university want their employees to be 
aware of what the ISP is.  
Furthermore, there is an understanding that the university does not take responsibility for the 
security capability among the employees but instead depend on them being intelligent about it. 
Participant 6 showing how the norm is relying on employees’ common sense and the lack of 
engagement from the employee themselves, “I mean no, I guess it’s more that you use your 
common sense and don’t think about the fact that there might be a policy”. Thus, showing how 
the lack of knowledge stems from both the employee and the employer.  
5.3 IT Security Systems & Rules 
5.3.1 Ease of Use 
A majority of the participants expressed that there are several systems which are time-
consuming, inefficient or bulky. Participant 3 are here describing two of the systems the faculty 
members have to use, “the programs is awfully clunky and seems very archaic and not very 
functional, so those two systems come to mind”. Participant 2 pointed out that some systems 
cause quite a disturbance when used and that they therefore avoid those systems. There was 
also a difference in how much this bothered the participants, with some being very disturbed 
and others not being able to really think of any system which bothers them. However, all 
participants agreed that the systems are easy to use and see no real trouble managing any 
security related task. So, the problem is not that it is difficult, but rather that it is inefficient and 
can be in the way of the faculty members doing their work by taking up time and performance.  
The participants were also willing to sacrifice a certain level of convenience for more security 
if they understood why it was necessary and depended a lot on what they are protecting. 
However, if a system is significantly reducing the performance of their devices then the 
reflection is that they will not use the system unless it is necessary, regardless of the safety 
benefits. Both participant 1 and 4 state that they only use certain security systems in order to 
access resources. Thereof, not using it in other situations in order to keep the university and 
sensitive data safe. 
Furthermore, the participants did not really see any benefits of not using the IT security systems, 
they pointed out some flaws of the systems and how it can be improved but were overall 
satisfied with their interaction with the systems. Showing that having easy to use systems is 
beneficial to make the system blend in and become invisible.  
5.3.2 Signs of breaking or violating the ISP 
All participants talked about ways they break the ISP, either by not using the recommended 
systems, using their own devices, using external software for e.g., storage, using their 
professional email for personal business or by not changing their password every six to eight 
months. However, as discussed above, none of them knew what the ISP contains. Some stating 




that the ISP does specifically say that GU Box should not be used for confidential data (Din 
Säkerhet) but several participants view GU Box as the place to share that kind of information. 
Showing a large inconsistency of storage. The participants often mentioned storage as a big 
problem, either in terms of violating the ISP or by not knowing how to approach that problem. 
Participant 6 said that they store data from research interviews on their computer and use 
dropbox even though they are aware that management does not want them to use dropbox. 
Participant 6 says that they are supposed to use GU Box instead for the sensitive data. 
Something which is mentioned by several other participants as well.  
You might not always be so aware about the risks. If you think in terms of shadow IT, 
that maybe you sometimes want to use different software to make your work easier, like 
transcribing and things like that, and maybe you then try to download something 
without really thinking of the consequences. (P6) 
Many have used their email for private purposes, they use google drive to collaborate, dropbox 
for storage, other external software for transcribing, download software without really making 
sure it is completely safe and connecting their professional devices towards unprotected 
networks such as a public network at a café. As one can see, there are no great transgressions 
of the policy, the faculty members seem to use their professional devices in a similar fashion as 
their private ones, with small variations. It is not clear if they are more careful and mindful of 
cyberthreats with their private devices or their professional ones. They avoid mixing their 
personal and professional errands on the devices, however, they all explained that cybersecurity 
is important to them generally in life. They use similar security practices in professional settings 
as they do in private settings, showing that habit place a large part in how they approach 
security. Additionally, many participants bring with them security habits from previous 
workplaces, where ISP have been stricter and better communicated. 
5.3.3 Formal Sanctions 
No participant had any knowledge about formal sanctions from the university in cases where 
employees violated the ISP. Participant 3 mentioning, “without having tried to break it, it's not 
something that I worry too much about”. The formal sanctions from the university is not 
something which worry the participants, even though they do not know what they are. 
The participants did however have opinions on what they thought the sanctions and the 
procedure following a possible violation should be. Suggestions from the participants stemmed 
from the assumption that the violation was not ill-intended, so they advocated having an 
educational approach to help people do the right thing before using sanctions.  
For the first instance [of violation] they would sort of take an educational approach and 
then if it was clear that somebody was being, yeah not taking their job seriously, even 
after a warning and a support, then things might be more serious. (P3)  
Also, making sure that the ISP are not too strict so you set up barriers for the faculty members 




prevent people from doing their work and the tendency would then be for people just not to do 
their work.” 
There was a significant number of participants who asked about the formal sanctions when 
asked about the consequences of violating the policy, showing that there is an interest in how 





The discussion section aim answer the research question: How do faculty members reflect on 
university information security policy? Finding that faculty members rarely reflect on their 
protection behavior, they were unaware what the ISP was and they believed the university’s 
vulnerability is medium to high. To justify their violations of ISP and maladaptive behavior 
they used e.g., denial of responsibility and metaphor of the ledger. Furthermore, formal 
sanctions seem to play a small role on determining compliance. Thus, showing there is a width 
to the faculty members’ reflections and even though they have limited knowledge of both IT 
and the ISP, they still express valuable reflections which are important to understanding 
employee compliance. 
6.1 Protection Motivation Theory 
6.1.1 Perceived vulnerability 
The participants expressed an overall understanding of the threat the university faces. The 
perceived vulnerability makes the participant expect a certain degree of ISP and also expressed 
the possibility for more security, due to the risk the university face and the lack of engagement 
from the university. However, since the faculty have not engaged in learning the ISP, reading 
the information available, it does not seem like the perceived vulnerability motivates them to 
comply with ISP. This finding supports the findings from Vance et al. (2012) that perceived 
vulnerability did not have a significant effect on intention to comply with ISP. The perceived 
vulnerability does however increase the motivation to learn the ISP and try to understand what 
they should do. Thus, showing that perceived vulnerability might still be a relevant factor in 
employee compliance, even though it is not directly related to the intention to engage in 
protective behavior.  
6.1.2 Perceived Severity 
The participants often referred to lack of knowledge of the technicality of the IT systems. 
However, the problem is the lack of knowledge of the possible attacks and the consequences of 
those attacks, not their technical knowledge of how the cybersecurity systems work.  
Many referred to the big email debacle the previous year which damaged their faith in the IT 
capability of the university. Thus, increasing the perceived severity because members of the 
faculty now believe that the impact of a cyberattack would be higher than before the email 
debacle. However, no one seem to have previously reflected on the fact that poor management 
of the email incident could mean poor management in the case of a cyberattack and that they 
as employees should therefore help prevent that from happening. Thereof, showing that 




affect their reflections on their protective behavior. Ifinedo (2012) also found that perceived 
severity did not affect intention to comply with ISP and this could help to better understand his 
findings. 
6.1.3 Rewards 
The rewards of not complying with ISP should reduce the perceived vulnerability and severity 
of the threats. The reason no real benefit was noted by the participants can be explained by the 
ease of use of the systems and also that there are not that many security systems. Furthermore, 
the fact that the systems are mandatory can make the system more invisible, it becomes an 
unavoidable “truth”. Since there is no other way to enter the system other than entering your 
password and the system logs you out after 10 minutes of inactivity, they just comply. In the 
beginning it might be annoying, when asked to reflect upon it their attention might once again 
be brought to it. But during a regular workday, it is not something which they reflect on or 
which bothers them.  
Nevertheless, participant admitted to not using systems which reduced the performance or cause 
a disturbance. Showing that there is a reward in engaging in the maladaptive behavior, not using 
these systems. Furthermore, participants mixed their professional and personal email for both 
work-related and private errands. This study cannot say anything on how rewards may affect 
perceived vulnerability and severity. However, there are clear rewards in engaging in 
maladaptive behavior, thus giving a possible explanation why, despite seeing the university’s 
vulnerability and the severity a cyberattack can have, the participants do not reflect more on 
their protective behavior or have increase motivation to comply with ISP.  
6.1.4 Self-efficacy 
Self-efficacy is the belief in oneself that you can perform all the tasks necessary to follow the 
ISP. The participants had quite high self-efficacy, seeing themselves as quite capable to both 
handle the task necessary to complete a security response and also, avoid a possible cyberthreat. 
The belief of their ability to avoid a possible cyberthreat could stem from the high computer 
literacy (D’arcy, 2005). The high self-efficacy was even though they did not know the ISP or 
had gotten any guidance from the university. Therefore, the belief of their cybersecurity 
capability comes from other sources. However, since they see themselves as fairly computer-
savvy, the confidence from other digital areas might result in their high self-efficacy concerning 
cybersecurity as well. Moreover, since only one form of cyberattack was mentioned, phishing 
emails, the lack of consideration for other forms of attack and the understanding of what these 
attacks entail may result in a higher self-efficacy.  
Due to feeling overburden by work, the self-efficacy regarding learning new things might be 
lower. Here, it shows that low self-efficacy might decrease the engagement in protective 
behavior, such as feeling they can take the time to learn the ISP and doing that would be 
meaningful. Furthermore, they expressed that common sense is what is expected and the norm. 
It is likely that since they do not know the ISP they instead their so-called common sense. 




personal usage and previous workplaces. Additionally, the lack of discussion about 
cybersecurity at the university is interpreted by the participants as leaving it up to the faculty 
members to use their general knowledge of online security to keep themselves and the data safe.  
A higher self-efficacy should result in an increased coping appraisal (Floyd et al., 2000). The 
reflections about their self-efficacy showed reflections about engaging in protective behavior 
and an awareness of various protective behavior such as avoiding suspicious websites and 
emails. Therefore, indicating that self-efficacy might play a role in overall employee 
compliance.  
6.1.5 Response efficacy 
The response efficacy is the belief that if you follow the security systems and routines, this will 
be effective in protecting the organization and yourself. The results showed that employees 
have a low belief in that their behavior will make a significant change in protecting the 
university. This is expected since the university does not engage the faculty making sure they 
know the ISP and understand the security environment the university exist in. Raising the 
response efficacy could be necessary if other IT security routines are implemented or if the 
university wants to increase the usage of security systems which are not mandatory.  
Furthermore, the reflections about the university’s capability did seem to affect the faculty 
members’ reflections about the importance of following the ISP. Along with if the ISP seemed 
necessary and actually protected something the faculty members believed to be worth 
protecting. There were also reflections on response efficacy where the participants seemed to 
be more willing to endure a more annoying security process if there is high response efficacy.  
Vance et al. (2012) found that response efficacy had the negative effect on intention to comply. 
Meanwhile, Warkentin et al. (2016) found that response efficacy did not correlate to intention 
to continuation of protective behavior. So, one explanation for the inconsistent findings could 
be that response efficacy can increase the acceptance of security system, even though it is 
annoying, but not increase the intention to comply. However, if response efficacy is paired with 
a high usefulness of the system, perhaps this could affect intentions to comply as well.  
6.1.6 Response cost 
Response cost is anything which makes it more difficult or inconvenient for the faculty 
members to follow the ISP. The findings showed that there are several security systems which 
the participants find to be unnecessary and time-consuming. These systems raise the response 
cost and decreases the likelihood of continued use. However, since several systems are 
mandatory and difficult to work around they are used anyway. The participants did not indicate 
that the response costs affect their decision to follow the ISP but rather the necessity of the 
system. Therefore, the lack of knowledge of ISP and cyberthreat becomes an issue since the 




Posey et al. (2015) pointed out that some protective behaviors require more effort than others 
to perform, which can be one explanation why some of these systems are seen as more in the 
way than others. Logging in and out is not seen as overly annoying, probably because it requires 
little effort from the employee, it is just a mild nuisance.  
Overall, the participants do not reflect on cybersecurity a lot, but rather use the basic knowledge 
they have and use the systems they have to in order to complete a task. When asked to reflect 
on security, all think it is important and something worth looking into and even increase. 
However, there is a fear of awkwardly installed programs which will increase their workload 
and take up too much of their time. Nevertheless, the willingness to engage is there as well as 
the basic understanding of how important cybersecurity is.  
6.2 Neutralization Theory 
6.2.1 Denial of Responsibility 
The lack of knowledge was the most common explanation for lack of an answer and explanation 
for why they do not follow the ISP. The lack of knowledge was used as an explanation for any 
violation of the ISP, why they were unable to answer what possible risk the university could be 
facing and what the consequences of a possible cyberattack could be. Denying any 
responsibility makes it easier for the member of faculty to justify their ignorance and lack of 
knowledge of the ISP. Posey et al. (2015) explained that each employee has the choice of 
whether or not to actively engage in protecting the information they have access to. Denial of 
responsibility enables the faculty members to choose to not actively engage in protecting the 
information and instead leave that responsibility to someone else. 
6.2.2 Denial of Injury 
The perceived vulnerability of the university was by some seen as average. Not all shared this 
opinion, instead viewing the vulnerability as high. Nevertheless, the ones rating the perceived 
vulnerability as low might be using denial of injury to help justify their possible violation of 
ISP or engagement in maladaptive behavior. By downplaying the risks, they also lower their 
perceived risk of their behavior causing damage to the university. Furthermore, by saying that 
there might not be any information worth protecting or wondering why anyone would target a 
university, they also deny the injury of their maladaptive behavior.  
6.2.3 Defense of Necessity 
There is little in the result showing that defense of necessity is a justification technique used by 
the participants. No participant raised a situation where they felt the need to violate the security 
system in order to get something done or due to a moral dilemma. Therefore, the participants 
raise that there is little cybersecurity in place and that more could be done. Perhaps because 
there are so few systems and they are all fairly easy to use, there are few situations which present 
a moral dilemma. Also, because a lot of the systems are mandatory and difficult to work around, 




However, the bulkiness and inefficiency of some of the university systems can justify not using 
them. It becomes necessary for the faculty members to use other sharing platforms which are 
not approved by management. It could be seen as unreasonable or too inefficient to use the 
university’s software and all security programs. Therefore, putting the faculty members in the 
moral dilemma of either doing their work easy and efficiently or spend a lot of time handling 
bulky systems.  
6.2.4 Condemn the Condemners 
P1 “a lot of those are ridiculous. I wouldn't follow them anyway”. Siponen and Vance (2010) 
gave an example of condemn the condemners as breaking the rule because it is unreasonable, 
which is exactly what participant 1 is saying, thus, justifying breaking part of the ISP. There 
were a significant number of participants who questioned part of the ISP, even if they did not 
know it. However, some expressed that they have a responsibility to follow the ISP. Showing 
clearly there are varied used of the neutralization techniques. There are those who justify their 
actions through condemnation and those who does not, instead they see it as their responsibility 
to follow all rules even though they might be ridiculous in someone else’s eyes.  
6.2.5 Appeal to higher loyalties 
Appeals to higher loyalties was used when the participants choose to use external software for 
sensitive information sharing by saying they were not the project leader and there was a social 
factor to using those services. This is a way to justify the usage of these external websites which, 
when asked about it, they are unsure about using due to security reasons. This shows that some 
of the protection behavior trickles down, making it more important that management and people 
in leadership positions understand the importance of using secure sharing platforms. 
Furthermore, the participants express that as an employee it is their responsibility to follow the 
ISP and the rules the university sets. This again is an appeal to higher loyalties but instead 
justifying why they might use inefficient or awkward systems. Thus, concluding that appeal to 
higher loyalties does occur in the participants reflection and is a relevant aspect when trying to 
understand employee compliance.  
6.2.6 Metaphor of the Ledger 
The participant listed all the protective behaviors they engage in, they also listed other 
protective behaviors whether they engaged in them or not. This could be explained by the 
metaphor of the ledger. By listing situations where they engage in protective behavior could be 
interpreted as them trying to justify all the times they violate the ISP or engage in maladaptive 
behavior. Furthermore, by listing other protective behavior, showing that they know of them, 
can also be an indication of a way to justify their violations. They violate the ISP because they 
do know a lot of protective behaviors and just knowing these behaviors can count as an action 
in favor or protecting the university. The conclusion being that the faculty members count their 
knowledge as a good act compensating for the violations.  
The participants show that their reflection coincide with the justification techniques presented 




techniques. Therefore, the techniques might be applied differently by each individual. 
Furthermore, each individual has different moral dilemmas and face unique situations, thus 
presenting a varied need for each of the techniques.  
6.3 Deterrence Theory 
6.3.1 Formal Sanctions 
Formal sanctions are any sanctions from the university. These are supposed to be certain, swift 
and severe if they are to be efficient (Gibbs, 1968). The main issue here being, no participant 
had any knowledge about any formal sanctions and they did not have any reflections about what 
the certainty, swiftness and severity could be. The results showed that the participants do not 
want strict punishments but they were encouraging a system which helps them understand and 
better follow the current ISP. Therefore, if a deterrence system is in place, having an educational 
approach could be greatly appreciated by the faculty members. The participants did not believe 
that people were breaking the ISP will ill-intentions but rather out of ignorance. Showing good 
faith in their fellow faculty members. Therefore, the perceived vulnerability to internal threat 
might affect the reflections about the formal sanctions. If there is no perceived internal threat, 
the faculty member might feel there is little justification to have certain, strict and severe 
punishments.  
6.3.2 Informal Sanctions 
The self-approval played a substantial role for the participants in their reflection to comply with 
the ISP. However, based on the results even though some participants had higher expectations 
on themselves and were more committed to learning the ISP, there was no difference in 
knowledge about the ISP nor any difference on their perception of usage of voluntary security 
systems. Therefore, just because someone feels it is more important did not seem to affect their 
perception of other aspect of cybersecurity, such as vulnerability or severity. The only 
difference was a more of a willingness and openness to learn the ISP in order to follow it. The 
others were also willing to learn and follow the ISP. However, several were still more critical 
and required more thought and purpose behind it and would not willingly sacrifice their time 
and convenience just because someone said so. This could mean that if other security measures 
are implemented, possible critique should not be seen as an unwillingness or resistance to the 
change but rather as a lack of communication of the necessity of the change or, possibly, as a 
critique on the effectiveness and necessity of the change.  
Furthermore, social approval was believed to directly affect the participants ability to speak up 
against ISP violation, such as using external sharing services. Thus, indicating that social 
approval does not necessarily increase employees’ intention to comply but it depends on the 
social norms at that workplace. Therefore, managing the social culture and actively engaging 





Additionally, there is no security culture at the university. It is barely talked about and could be 
one reason why there is little knowledge and no one feels any real pressure to follow the ISP or 
know it. But interestingly, Paternoster and Simpson (1996) introduced shame as factor in DT 
and shame would be a good explanation for the statements about why the faculty members 
would feel “foolish” if they fell for a phishing email. Thus, providing motivation to be aware 








The purpose of this thesis was to bring more understanding to employee compliance by 
researching how faculty members reflect on university information security policy. To answer 
the question the theories protection motivation theory (PMT), deterrence theory (DT) and 
neutralization theory (NT) were used to help explain and give a deeper understanding on why 
faculty members reflect the way they do and how this can be interpreted. The results show that 
the university faculty members lack knowledge of the information security policy (ISP), they 
know information security is important and engage in an ad hoc collection of protective 
behaviors. However, they also admit engaging in behavior they know can put the university at 
risk, even though most view the university’s vulnerability to be average to high and expect the 
severity of a possible cyberattack to be high. Furthermore, they did not have any reflections on 
formal sanctions as they were unaware if there were any. Nevertheless, the informal sanctions 
provided interesting insight with social approval being something the faculty members deemed 
relevant in whether or not they violate the ISP. Neutralization techniques such as denial of 
responsibility and condemnation was used to undermine the consequences of their actions and 
justify why they violate the ISP. Therefore, PMT, DT and NT were effective in deepening the 
understanding of how the faculty members reflect on university information security policy. 
7.1 Practical Implications  
Security Education, Training and Awareness (SETA) is needed at the university. It highlights 
the importance of following the ISP and bring understanding of the threat the university is 
facing. This does not need to be a large investment but just having a more interactive and easily 
digested ISP could help, such as a workshop or short presentation. However, SETA does not 
automatically result in compliance with ISP, but it can increase the success rate of the 
cybersecurity process. Also, engaging each department and not putting the responsibility on the 
faculty members, unintentionally relying on their common sense, habits and computer 
knowledge in regard to cybersecurity .  
The thesis shows that having ISP which are not too complicated, is mandatory to complete 
certain tasks and serves a purpose, are the ones faculty accept the most and does not mind 
following. This can be implemented by the university to instead have an ISP which they work 
actively with rather than one passively sitting on their webpage because they have to have one. 




7.2 Future Research 
Suggestions for future research is deterrence theory’s variable virtual status, which means how 
much of the work is done away from the central workplace. Because of Covid-19 more of the 
work is done at home, if not all of it, including meetings and lectures. Therefore, it would be 
interesting to see how this have affected the overall understanding of deterrence theory and 
efficiency of sanctions.  
Conducting research where the theories PMT, DT and NT are combined in order to better 
explain employee compliance overall can be meaningful and would be the next step to see how 
well these theories work together to help understand employee compliance.  
Reflections from other settings, such as other departments, other government agencies and also 
private organizations, and from other positions is needed to expand the understanding of how 
employees reflect on ISP. Complementing this study, would be investigating the reflections of 
the employees at the IT department at University of Gothenburg. Thus, enabling a comparison 
between the faculty members and members of the IT department. Lastly, research connecting 
employee reflections to employee compliance can be interesting and help connect the different 
fields of research within employee compliance research to bring a deeper understanding and 
help find important factors in how to translate employee reflections into employee compliance. 
7.3 Limitations 
The study’s generalizability is limited to a university setting. Furthermore, can the other 
reflections and a more complete view of faculty members’ reflection be achieved if interviews 
were not only conducted with full-time employees. Interviews can be time-consuming and 
complementing with a survey, gathering data from more departments and participants would 
increase the generalizability within the university. Moreover, the scope is limited to how the 
reflections of the faculty members can be explained by PMT, DT and NT and will not 
investigate how these theories relates to the actual intention to engage in protective behaviors. 
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9.1 Interview Guide 
These are the questions used during the interviews. The questions were asked in an ad hoc 
manner so the order below is not related to how they were asked during the interviews. Due to 
the interviews being semi-structured, all questions were not asked to all participants . 
Furthermore, other follow-up questions, not listed here, were asked when appropriate.  
• Do you know about the university’s cybersecurity policy?  
• What are your thoughts on the university’s cybersecurity policy and routines? 
• When working on distance do you use Cisco VPN AnyConnect? 
• Do you have access to sensitive, confidential, or personal data?  
• Do you use your own computer or one from GU?  
• Have you experience any hacking attempt?  
• Would you be willing to sacrifice convenience for guaranteed security? 
• Any security system which is annoying? 
• Do you think it is important in your role as a researcher, teacher, and employee to 
follow the cybersecurity policy?  
• Are there situations where you believe it is justified not to follow the cybersecurity 
policy? 
• Do you think it is necessary to follow all cybersecurity routines or is it enough to just 
follow some?  
• Is it okay to break the cybersecurity rules if you feel it was necessary?  
• Is it okay to break the cybersecurity rules if it is preventing you to get your job done?  
• Is cybersecurity important to you in generally in life? 
• What is the security culture like in your work group?  
• Do you think the consequences from the university of breaking the cybersecurity 
routines are severe and just?  
o Changed to: do you know of any consequences from the university if you 




• Is it likely to get caught breaking the security policy?  
• Is the university quick to notice someone breaking the security policy?  
• Do you have the technical know-how and all necessary information to follow the ISP?  
• Do you feel like you have to technical know-how to avoid cyberthreats more 
efficiently than others?  
• Does the university care about security?  
• What are your thoughts on the usefulness of the university’s cybersecurity systems 
and routines against cyberattacks?  
• Do you feel that the cybersecurity systems and routines easy to use? 
• How often do you use or come across security systems in a day? Like entering your 
password etc.  
• If a system needs updating is that something you can do or is it IT support’s 
responsibility to keep track of it?  
• What are the benefits of not using the security systems? Social, time, efficiency?  
• What are the costs of not using it?  
• If the university were attacked, do you think it would be easily resolved? 
• What do you think is the risk of the university being the victim of a cyberattacks? 
• Are the security routines enough to reduce the cyberthreats the university are facing?  
• How do you respond to a cybersecurity threat?  
 
